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Abstract: Using a gravity model, we estimate the magnitude of potential trade flows between Ireland
and the five CEEC countries which are currently negotiating accession to the EU. We find that
Irish exports were already close to their “normal” level in 1994, but that imports from the CEECs
were still less than half of their potential size. The value of estimated potential trade corresponds to
0.8 per cent of Irish GNP. The actual share in 1994 was 0.5 per cent. EU enlargement would raise
Ireland-CEEC trade to 1.2 per cent of GNP. The short-term scope for trade expansion therefore
appears to be modest. Stronger potential for trade growth emerges in the “long-term” scenario,
which assumes partial income convergence of the EU and the CEECs. According to our upper-limit
estimate in the convergence scenario, the value of Irish trade with the CEECs could reach 8.3 per
cent of Irish GNP in 2020.
I  INTRODUCTION
t is all but certain that a number of Central and Eastern European countries I (CEECs) will join the European Union in the next decade. The EU opened
bilateral accession negotiations with six applicant countries in April 1998, and
it has declared a strategic aim to embrace an even wider circle of new members
in the medium term.
These impending changes will undoubtedly impact significantly on a small160 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
open economy such as Ireland.1 Enlargement by the six front runner countries
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia would swell
the EU’s population by 17 per cent, but EU GDP would only expand by 2.5 per
cent (World Bank, 1997). Yet, the particular features of the applicant countries
— proximity to the core EU markets, relatively low labour costs and an educated
workforce — could make them formidable competitors for Irish exporters.
Conversely, the opening of Central and Eastern European (CEEC) markets, all
poised for rapid growth, will boost demand for Irish exports. The magnitude of
these forces as well as the net effect are moot points. The issue has been explored
in some detail by NESC (1997) and IBEC (1996). These studies reported a small
share of the CEECs in Irish trade, accounting for about 1 per cent of total imports
and exports, and the recent emergence of pronounced Irish surpluses. Both
reports emphasise considerable potential for growth in these trade flows.
However, their predictions are not underpinned by rigorous analysis. Our work
is a contribution to filling this gap.
We use a gravity model to estimate the “normal” or “potential” volume of
trade between Ireland and the CEECs, which can then be compared to observed
trade flows. Variants of this methodology have previously been applied in several
studies to gauge the potential for trade expansion between the CEECs and the
EU as a whole.2 Country-specific studies have been carried out for Germany
(Schumacher, 1997); Spain (Martin and Gual, 1994); and Greece (Dimelis and
Gatsios, 1994). The approach has not, however, been applied specifically to trade
between the CEECs and Ireland.3
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we give a brief survey of
trade patterns between Ireland and Eastern Europe. Section III discusses the
gravity model. The results of our gravity estimation for Irish trade with the
CEECs are reported in Section IV. We produce estimates both for the short-to-
medium term and for the longer run. The main conclusions are summarised in
Section V.
1. Trade liberalisation does not hinge exclusively on accession of the CEECs. Under the Europe
Agreements, tariffs and quotas have been eliminated by the EU. However, some visible obstacles
remain in agriculture-related industrial sectors — many of which are the pillars of CEEC comparative
advantage — and a host of non-tariff barriers will only be eliminated when the CEECs become
fully-fledged participants in the EU’s Internal Market (European Commission, 1997).
2. See Hamilton and Winters (1992); Baldwin (1994); Winters and Wang (1994; Faini and Portes
(1995); and Vittas and Mauro (1997).
3. For a previous gravity analysis of Irish trade flows, see Fitzpatrick (1984).IRELAND’S TRADING POTENTIAL WITH CEECS 161
II  PATTERNS OF TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND THE CEECs
2.1 CEEC Trade with the EU
The active dismantling of EU-CEEC trade barriers goes back to the signing
of the first Europe Agreements in 1992. In the meantime, such agreements
have been signed with ten countries (henceforth referred to as “CEEC-10”):
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia (henceforth referred
to as “CEEC-5”), Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. Under
the terms of the Europe Agreements, access for EU goods to CEEC markets was
liberalised more slowly than that for CEEC goods to EU markets. However,
“sensitive” sectors, including clothing, steel and agriculture, were largely
excluded in the early transition years, and the Europe Agreements were therefore
criticised for impeding access to EU markets for the most competitive CEEC
industries. Even though visible barriers on non-agricultural imports have by
now been abolished, a host of non-tariff barriers, ranging from different product
standards to inaccessible public procurement markets, continue to impede CEEC
exports to the EU (European Commission, 1997).
Table 1 charts the recent developments in the CEECs’ share in EU imports.
In all cases, CEEC shares have grown substantially, expanding by between 9
per cent (Slovenia) and 217 per cent (Estonia) over the 1993-1996 period.
However, the rapid expansion of CEEC exports to the EU was from a very low
base. In 1996, CEEC-10 exports still accounted for less than 10 per cent of EU
imports. Table 2 shows that EU exports to the CEECs have increased less rapidly
than corresponding imports. However, in absolute terms, the EU has continued
to export more goods and services to the CEECs than it imports from them. The
net outcome is a strong positive trade balance for the EU in its trade with Eastern
Europe.
Table 1: Share of CEEC Imports in Total EU Imports*
Partner Country  Share in Total Extra-EU Imports (%) Percentage  Increase
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1993-1996
Czech Republic n.a. 1.19 1.23 1.65 1.68 41
Estonia 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.19 217
Hungary 1.06 1.04 1.17 1.39 1.52 46
Poland 1.72 1.82 1.95 2.25 2.11 16
Slovenia 0.34 0.67 0.66 0.78 0.73 9
CEEC-5 n.a. 4.78 5.06 6.23 6.23 30
CEEC-10 3.97 5.97 6.51 8.15 8.11 36
*imports from non-EU countries only.
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Table 2: Share of the CEECs in Total EU Exports*
Partner Country  Share in Total Extra-EU Imports (%) Percentage  Increase
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1993-1996
Czech Republic n.a. 1.50 1.46 2.05 2.24 49
Estonia 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.24 0.27 170
Hungary 1.28 1.37 1.54 1.53 1.60 17
Poland 2.24 2.36 2.33 2.65 3.18 35
Slovenia 0.34 0.77 0.70 0.91 0.86 12
CEEC-5 n.a. 6.10 6.09 7.38 8.15 34
CEEC-10 n.a. 7.50 7.55 9.31 10.18 36
*exports to non-EU countries only.
Source: Eurostat Comext database.
Our data show that, in the early 1990s, trade between the EU and the CEECs
has flourished. This might suggest that EU exports have not been adversely
affected by delayed access to East European markets under the terms of the
Europe Agreements, and that CEECs were able to exploit new exporting
opportunities in the EU. However, there is empirical evidence that the safeguard
provisions of the Europe Agreements have been effective in holding back CEEC
exports in “sensitive” products (Vittas and Mauro, 1997). Full integration of
CEECs into the EU’s internal market is therefore poised to generate further
growth in trade volumes. This paper aims to quantify such expectations for
Ireland.
2.2 CEEC Trade with Ireland
Ireland’s trade exposure to the CEECs is lower than the EU average. Tables
3 and 4 show that the CEEC-5 (and even the CEEC-10) account for less than 1
per cent of the total value of Irish trade, including trade with EU countries.4 In
the 1993-95 period, the share of the CEEC-5 in Irish imports remained roughly
stable. In contrast, Irish exports to those countries rose significantly over the
same period, from 0.4 to 0.8 per cent of total exports. Early opportunities for
enhanced trade between the CEECs and Ireland therefore appear to have been
grasped more successfully by Irish business. The upshot is a substantial and
growing surplus in Ireland’s trade with CEECs, accounting for over 2 per cent
4. These are percentages of total Irish trade, and can therefore not be compared directly to those
reported in Tables 1 and 2, which are scaled to extra-EU trade. However, even if we calculate Ireland-
CEEC trade as a share of Irish trade with non-EU countries, Irish trade exposure to the CEECs
turns out significantly lower than the EU average. For instance, in 1995 Irish exports to (imports
from)  the CEEC-5 accounted for 3.0 (1.0) per cent of Irish extra-EU trade, which compares to EU
averages of 7.3 (6.3) per cent.IRELAND’S TRADING POTENTIAL WITH CEECS 163
of the total Irish trade surplus in 1995 (NESC, 1997). The Irish trade experience
is in marked contrast to that of the EU as a whole, which has witnessed a
stronger growth in imports from CEECs than in exports to those countries.
Table 3: Irish Imports from CEECs
1993 1994 1995
     Partner £’000* %# £’000* %# £’000* %#
Czech Republic 8,757 0.06 16,356 0.09 20,561 0.10
Estonia 78 0.00 69 0.00 1,850 0.01
Hungary 4,681 0.03 7,048 0.04 12,586 0.06
Poland 51,328 0.34 53,375 0.31 45,221 0.22
Slovenia 5,904 0.04 4,976 0.03 5,076 0.02
CEEC-5 70,748 0.47 81,824 0.48 85,294 0.42
CEEC-10 82,053 0.55 96,482 0.56 104,636 0.52
Source: CSO. *current prices, #per centage of total imports.
Table 4: Irish Exports to CEECs
1993 1994 1995
     Partner £’000* %# £’000* %# £’000* %#
Czech Republic 23,758 0.12 37,934 0.17 67,692 0.25
Estonia 926 0.00 2,539 0.01 5,876 0.02
Hungary 16,657 0.08 27,440 0.12 44,277 0.16
Poland 33,377 0.17 41,649 0.18 85,657 0.31
Slovenia 4,520 0.02 5,335 0.02 10,566 0.04
CEEC-5 79,238 0.39 114,897 0.50 214,068 0.78
CEEC-10 85,705 0.43 126,225 0.55 253,854 0.93
Source: CSO. *current prices, #per centage of total exports.
Given that Irish trade volumes with the CEECs are still comparatively small,
and that Irish exports have grown substantially faster than CEEC exports, one
might be tempted to conclude that there is pent-up export supply from CEECs
which could exercise substantial competitive pressure on the Irish economy once
the CEECs’ access to the EU market has been further liberalised, and once
these countries have established more effective export and marketing policies.
It is this question of “potential” trade volumes that we now investigate more
carefully.164 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
III  THE GRAVITY MODEL
3.1 The Gravity Model and Eastern European Trade
The post-war economic isolation of the CEECs, their distorted pricing
structures and their recent transition from central planning to a market economy
make it difficult to estimate, on the basis of extrapolation from historical patterns,
the level of trade which is likely to prevail between EU countries and CEECs
after full economic liberalisation.5 For this reason, a method of estimation other
than one based on historical trade patterns needs to be applied.
The gravity model provides a cross-section alternative to intertemporal
extrapolation. Using this approach, trade is estimated as a function of a number
of basic determinants among a reference group of countries which are assumed
to exhibit “normal” trade relations. Parameter estimates based on the reference
group are applied to the countries whose potential trade flows are of interest.
The actual trade volumes of these countries can then be compared to the trade
volumes predicted by the model.
The gravity model considers three fundamental determinants of trade:
(1) export supply, captured by income and income per capita of the exporting
country (2) import demand, captured by income and income per capita of the
importing country, and (3) transaction costs, captured by geographical distance
and variables representing policy and cultural barriers to trade. Since its
inception by Tinbergen (1962), this model has become a popular method of
analysis due to its parsimony and to its empirical robustness. Work by Anderson
(1979) and Bergstrand (1985) served to place this at first purely empirical model
on a solid theoretical footing. In its essence, the gravity equation can be
interpreted as a reduced-form version of the core model underlying the “new
trade theory”, characterised by horizontally differentiated goods, plant-level scale
economies and consumer preference for variety.6 This theoretical underpinning
is more appropriate for the explanation of manufactures trade than for resource-
driven trade in primary goods. Particularly in terms of export supply, the proxy
used in gravity studies (GDP or GNP) is an unsatisfactory explanation of trade
volumes in primary goods. It might therefore be argued that applying the gravity
equation to total trade volumes is misleading. The common line of defence is
that the bulk of intra-European trade is in manufactured goods, and that resource
endowments across European countries are quite similar in a world-wide
comparison (Baldwin, 1994). In addition, it has been shown that the gravity
prediction can also be generated in a Ricardian framework (Eaton and Kortum,
1997) and in a setting with complete specialisation in homogeneous goods
(Deardorff, 1998; Haveman and Hummels, 1996).
5. One way of avoiding this problem has been applied by Collins and Rodrik (1991). They used
trade data from pre-communist years (the 1920s) to estimate potential East-West trade volumes.
6. See Helpman and Krugman (1985, Ch. 8).IRELAND’S TRADING POTENTIAL WITH CEECS 165
3.2 Estimation of the Reference Model
The equation used in our analysis takes the form:
  
lnEXPij =b 0CONST +b1lnGNPi +b2 lnGNPj +b 3 lnGNPCAPi
 +b4 lnGNPCAPj +b 5 lnDISTij +b 6 lnREMj +b 7LANGij
  +b 8ADJij +b 9EUij +e
where EXPij = value of exports from country i to country j
GNPm = GNP of country m = [i,j]
GNPCAPm = GNP per capita of country m
DISTij = Distance between country i and country j
REMj = Remoteness of country j
LANGij = Language dummy
ADJij = Adjacency dummy
EUij = EU dummy
Following Ekholm et al. (1996), this equation is estimated for a reference sample
of 24 countries.7 Thirteen of these countries are members of the OECD and the
remaining eleven are classified as “outward oriented developing”. By basing
our estimates on a sample of countries which includes developing countries, the
model avoids producing results which are characteristic solely of trade flows
between industrialised countries.8 The costs of trade relative to distance may
be lower between rich industrialised countries due to high standards of infra-
structure. The determinants of trade volumes are also likely to differ, since the
share of intra-industry trade tends to increase in line with income per capita.
However, the inclusion of developing countries can also lead to problems due to
the fact that developing country trade is more likely to be affected by idiosyncratic
policy distortions. For this reason, we only include countries which have been
classified as having outward oriented trade strategies by Greenaway and Nam
(1988).
All data in the sample refer to 1994. We will thereby capture the CEECs’
trade structure well into the transition process, and we are not as affected as
earlier studies by the statistical complications arising from proximity to the
extraordinary conditions of central planning and its immediate aftermath. Our
7. Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Hong-Kong,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand,
Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay.
8. According to the World Bank (1997), the CEEC-10  belong to the “middle income” group of
countries, whose average per capita GNP is $2520 (1994 prices). Three of the ten (the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Slovenia) belong to the “upper middle income” group of countries which has an average
per capita GNP of $4,640. This compares with an average per capita GNP of $23,420 for “high
income” economies, which include Ireland ($13,530) and all other EU countries except for Greece.
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trade data are taken from the Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF, 1996). Import
data were used in preference to export data, as countries tend to be more vigilant
in recording import statistics. Trade flows recorded as zero were omitted.9
Distance is measured as the geographic distance between the economic centres
of the exporting and importing countries.10 The remoteness indicator REM is
the average of a country’s distances to its trade partners, weighted by those
partners’ GNPs. This variable was included in order to avoid potential mis-
specification as suggested by Polak (1996) and applied by Feenstra et al. (1998).
Income data at current market prices were taken from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators.
The results of our benchmark regression are presented in Table 5.
Reassuringly, the typical empirical success of the gravity specification is
manifested in a good fit; with an adjusted R2 of 0.76, and a standard error of the
regression equal to less than half the standard deviation, and less than one-
sixth the mean, of the regressand. All coefficients have the expected signs,
plausible magnitudes and are statistically significant at the 1 per cent confidence
level, except of the EU variable which is significant at 5 per cent.11
Table 5: Gravity Model Coefficient Estimates











Note: No. of observations: 537; adj. R2 = 0.76; standard error of the regression = 1.08.
*Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-values (White adjusted).
9. The problem with zero observations is that they are undefined in the log specification of the
gravity equation. Strictly taken, this is therefore a truncated data set, and a Tobit estimation
technique would be warranted. However, it has been shown in several studies that the point estimates
are not affected significantly by the estimation method used, and OLS has become the standard
technique in the literature (see, e.g., Baldwin, 1994). Furthermore, the number of zero observation
in our sample is small (15 out of 552, i.e. less than 3 per cent).
10. Distance data relate to the shortest geographical distance between countries’ prinicipal cities.
They are taken from Nilsson (1997).
11. Note that the size of the coefficient on distance (-0.4) is considerably smaller than that typically
found in earlier studies (–0.7). Given that our data are more recent than those used in the previous
studies, this is likely to reflect the erosion of spatial trade costs in global trade flows.IRELAND’S TRADING POTENTIAL WITH CEECS 167
In Table 6, we compare the trade volumes predicted on the basis of the gravity
coefficients with actual flows for 1994 for the reference group. It appears that
Ireland is “under-trading” with most of the countries in the reference sample.
Actual exports are only slightly smaller than predicted exports, but on the import
side, predicted trade values are more than 50 per cent larger than actual values.
This difference between exports and imports is particularly pronounced for Irish
trade with continental EU countries. The ratio of projected Irish exports over
actual exports is smaller than unity for all of these countries. Conversely, this
ratio exceeds unity for imports from all continental EU members, except for the
Nordic countries and the Netherlands. It is also striking that Irish trade with
the UK, albeit still accounting for the largest share, is below the predicted
“normal” level. It can be hypothesised that these trade patterns are to some
Table 6: Projected Irish Trade with the Reference Group (1994 US$ mn)
Partner Actual Projected Export Actual Projected Import
Country Exports Exports Ratio Imports Imports Ratio
Austria 271 221 0.82 105 227 2.16
Belgium-
    Luxembourg 1,454 556 0.38 351 582 1.66
Brazil 63 157 2.50 97 210 2.16
Canada 352 747 2.12 134 834 6.23
Chile 36 38 1.05 6 43 7.22
Finland 172 116 0.67 148 116 0.79
France 2,747 1,846 0.67 1,133 2,132 1.88
Germany 3,979 2,051 0.52 1,895 2,409 1.27
Hong Kong 73 278 3.81 146 282 1.93
Israel 105 85 0.81 40 87 2.18
Italy 1,563 1,137 0.73 654 1,322 2.02
Japan 1,415 1,628 1.15 1,507 1,938 1.29
Malaysia 285 44 0.15 325 51 0.16
Netherlands 1,305 474 0.36 796 507 0.64
Norway 322 183 0.57 436 180 0.41
Singapore 194 200 1.03 298 237 3.08
South Korea 0 184 n.a. 77 178 0.60
Sweden 426 237 0.56 385 245 0.64
Thailand 42 61 1.45 45 77 1.71
Tunisia 9 15 1.62 10 17 1.67
Turkey 96 68 0.70 40 86 2.15
UK 8,239 14,765 1.79 9,552 17,235 1.80
United States 2,953 4,295 1.45 4,265 5,462 1.28
Uruguay 3 18 6.16 1 19 19.18
Total 26,101 29,402 1.13 22,445 34,476 1.54168 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
extent a result of the domination of Irish trade statistics by the activities of
overseas multinational firms, who use Ireland as an assembly and export base
to serve the whole EU market.12 Our results support the opinion of those who
predict that the potential for a further re-orientation of Irish business away
from the UK market is limited (Gallagher and McAleese, 1994).
IV  PROJECTING IRISH TRADE WITH THE CEECs
Using the parameter estimates produced by the gravity equation, we compare
the “normal” trade volumes predicted by the model for Ireland-CEEC trade
with actual trade volumes. Our exercise is carried out in the first instance for a
“short-run” scenario, where incomes are held constant at 1994 levels. It is then
repeated for a “long-run” scenario, in which EU and CEEC per-capita incomes
are assumed to have partially converged.
4.1 “Short-Run” Projections
Our first exercise is to apply actual 1994 GNP and population values for the
CEECs and Ireland, and estimate “normal” trade flows by inserting these figures
into Equation (1). This gives us an indication of trade volumes which would
have prevailed between Ireland and the CEECs, had the latter been fully market-
oriented economies with liberalised trade régimes, but without EU membership.
As can be seen from Table 7, Irish exports to the CEECs are on average already
close to predicted levels. The outliers are Hungary, where projected Irish exports
are 69 per cent above actual levels, and Poland, where projected exports are 37
per cent below the actual value for 1994.
Table 7: “Short-Run” Ratios of Projected over Actual Values of Irish Trade
with the CEECs
Partner Exports Imports





CEEC-5 (Total) 0.92 2.30
CEEC-10 (Total) 1.11 2.47
*Irish imports from Estonia were recorded as zero.
12. Some caution should be exercised in the analysis of these data, as they are likely to be distorted
by the transfer-pricing practices of multinationals. To our knowledge, no attempt at quantifying the
effects of these practices has yet been undertaken.IRELAND’S TRADING POTENTIAL WITH CEECS 169
Irish imports from the CEECs were below “normal” levels in all cases. For
the CEEC-10 as a whole, predicted Irish imports are two-and-a-half times as
large as actual imports. The fact that the projected/actual ratio of Irish imports
exceeds that of exports is a consequence of the current Irish trade surpluses
with the CEECs. Our results clearly indicate that there is considerable scope
for an increase in Irish imports from the CEECs, even without EU enlargement,
and in spite of the growth of these trade flows in the early 1990s we reported in
Tables 1 to 4.
The next step in our exercise is to insert a value of 1 for the EU dummy,
hence to simulate the “short-run” effects of immediate EU enlargement on Irish
trade with the frontrunner applicants, the CEEC-5. Table 8 reports the results.
Given the parameter estimates from our reference sample, EU membership
increases predicted trade flows by 70.1 per cent for any country pair.13 Hence,
the projected value of Irish trade with the CEEC-5 would increase by over two-
thirds its “normal” value again, if EU enlargement were immediate. This increase
affects Irish exports and imports symmetrically.
Table 8: “Short-Run” Projections of Ireland-CEEC-5 Trade, with and without
EU Enlargement (1994 US$ mn)
  Partner IMPORTS EXPORTS
Actual Pred. Pred. with Actual Pred. Pred. with
enlargement enlargement
Czech Republic 21 36 62 38 32 55
Estonia 0 7 11 8 7 11
Hungary 7 55 94 29 49 84
Poland 48 67 115 87 54 93
Slovenia 5 22 38 18 23 38
CEEC-5 81 187 320 180 165 281
So far we have compared potential “short-run” changes in Irish trade volumes
with the CEEC-5 relative to base-year trade volumes. In this respect the scope
for trade growth looks very large. However, it might be more meaningful to look
at bilateral trade volumes relative to total Irish trade and relative to Irish GNP.
This is done in Table 9. We find that even the high predicted short-run growth
rates in these trade flows will not result in significant effects for Ireland in
macroeconomic terms. This is due, of course, to the small current size of Ireland-
CEEC-5 trade relative to the total Irish economy. For instance, even if Irish
13. This is obtained by taking the antilog of the coefficient estimate for the EU dummy in Table 5:
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trade volumes with the CEEC-5 were to shoot up to their “natural” levels, and
the EU were enlarged in the immediate future, our model predicts that the
value of Ireland-CEEC-5 trade would merely increase from 0.5 to 1.3 per cent of
Irish GNP.
Table 9: Potential Trade with CEEC-5, Scaled by Total Irish Exports, Imports
and GNP (1994 levels)
Imports from Exports to Total Trade
CEEC-5 CEEC-5 with CEEC-5
(% of total (% of total (% Irish
imports) exports) GNP)
Actual Trade 0.3 0.6 0.5
Predicted Trade:
no EU enlargement 0.7 0.5 0.8
with EU enlargement 1.2 0.9 1.2
4.2 “Long-Run” Projections
The previous section conveys no insights on the trade effects of changes in
relative income levels of the CEECs and Ireland. However, it is likely that, in
the medium to long term, CEEC incomes will to some extent catch up with
those of the EU. We therefore model a “long-run” scenario with partial income
convergence. Following Baldwin (1994), we hypothesise that the CEECs’ per
capita income levels will catch up with the average of Greek and Portuguese
per capita GNP by the year 2020, except for Slovenia, which is assumed to
attain Austrian income levels.14 Future growth rates for the relevant EU
countries are extrapolations from 1985-94 averages.15 In order to attain the
hypothesised degree of income convergence, the CEEC-5 would have to exhibit
annual rates of growth of between 5.8 and 7.8 per cent (see Table 10).
In reality, CEEC growth rates are rather unlikely to reach the levels under-
lying our projections, given historical trends in countries with comparable income
levels. The potential exports and imports predicted on foot of this convergence
scenario should therefore be seen as upper-bound estimates.
Table 11 shows the values of predicted trade in 2020 under our partial
convergence scenario both in nominal terms and as percentage of Irish GNP.
14. For the purpose of this analysis, population is held constant. Therefore GNP per capita and
GNP grow at the same rate. Experiments were done with convergence in the years 2010 and 2015
but in each case the implied growth rates were unrealistically high.
15. 1. 9 per cent for Austria, 1.3 per cent for Greece, 5.0 per cent for Ireland and 4.0 per cent for
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Table 10: Implied Growth Rates of CEEC-5, Assuming Partial
Income Convergence
Country Implied Growth Rate Actual Annual Growth
(%) 1990-1995* 
(%)





*World Bank (1997). For explanations, see text.
We divide our scenario into a situation with EU enlargement and one without.
In 1994, the potential volumes of trade with the EU frontrunners accounted for
between 0.8 and 1.2 per cent of Irish GNP. Estimated trade volumes in the
“long-run” scenario, however, account for up to 8.3 per cent of Irish GNP. On the
basis of these simulations, the EU frontrunner countries could clearly account
for significantly larger proportions of Irish exports and imports than they
currently do. It is apparent that the main potential for larger trade volumes
stems from economic growth in the CEECs, and not from EU enlargement.
Table 11: “Long-Run” Trade Potential
Exports, Imports, Total Trade, Total Trade,
2020 2020 2020 1994
No With No With No With No With
Enlarge- Enlarge- Enlarge- Enlarge- Enlarge- Enlarge- Enlarge- Enlarge-
ment ment ment ment ment ment ment ment
   Partner 1994 US$ mn % of Irish GNP
Czech
    Republic 708 1,204 787 1,339 0.87 1.48 0.14 0.24
Estonia 166 282 164 279 0.19 0.33 0.03 0.04
Hungary 874 1,486 972 1,653 1.08 1.83 0.21 0.37
Poland 1,633 2,778 1,964 3342 2.09 3.09 0.25 0.43
Slovenia 550 936 535 910 0.63 1.07 0.09 0.16
CEEC-5 3,931 6,686 4,422 7,523 4.86 8.27 0.73 1.24
V  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have estimated the magnitude of potential trade flows between Ireland
and the five CEEC countries currently negotiating accession to the EU. These172 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
trade flows have grown strongly in the early 1990s, particularly on the side of
Irish exports to the CEECs, but they still accounted for less than 1 per cent of
total Irish trade in 1995.
Using elasticity estimates generated by a gravity model for a 24-country
reference sample on data for 1994, we compute predicted trade volumes for
three scenarios: (i) “normal” trade relations, as exhibited by the reference sample,
ceteris paribus, (ii) “normal” trade volumes with added assumption that the EU
is enlarged to comprise the CEECs, and (iii) a “long-term” scenario assuming
partial income convergence between the CEECs and the EU.
We find that Irish export volumes are close to their “normal” level, but that
Irish imports from the CEECs were still less than half of their “normal” size in
1994. However, the estimated magnitudes are small in macroeconomic terms.
Total Ireland-CEEC trade accounted for 0.5 per cent of Irish GNP in 1994. The
“normal” level would have corresponded to 0.8 per cent of GNP. EU enlargement
would boost these trade flows by an additional 70 per cent, raising the volume
of Ireland-CEEC trade to 1.3 per cent of GNP. By far the strongest potential for
trade growth emerges in the “long-term” scenario, which assumes that CEEC
incomes converge with some low-income EU countries. According to our upper-
limit estimate in the convergence scenario, the value of Irish trade with the
CEECs could reach 8.3 per cent of Irish GNP in 2020.
Our simulations suggest that the trade effects of EU enlargement on the
Irish economy will be relatively modest. Significant trade-induced protectionist
pressures against enlargement are, therefore, unlikely to emerge in Ireland,
even though future trade expansion is likely to materialise mainly in the form
of a rise in the value of Irish imports from the CEECs. The main scope for trade
expansion stems from successful economic transition in the CEECs and the
resulting income catch-up with the EU. Of course, trade liberalisation, trade
expansion and income convergence are causally linked in reality and not as
neatly separable as in our study. A more sophisticated analysis, allowing for
positive growth effects of enlargement, might approximate our upper-bound,
“long-term” predictions.
Some caution needs to be applied to the interpretation of our results. Four
main limitations have to be borne in mind. First, our methodology does not
disaggregate trade flows by sectors. This is of particular importance for
agricultural trade, which accounts for a substantial proportion of Ireland-CEEC
trade, and to which the gravity model is not as well suited as to trade in
manufactured goods. The scope for sectoral disaggregation in future work is
evident. Second, we have to be careful in the normative interpretation of our
results. The rate of increase in trade volumes correlates positively with factor-
market adjustment costs as well as with the conventional gains from trade. Our
analysis does not permit inferences on the magnitude of these welfare effects. AIRELAND’S TRADING POTENTIAL WITH CEECS 173
study of intra-industry trade between Ireland and the CEECs could shed light
on the likely adjustment pressures induced by further trade expansion (see,
Brülhart and Hine, 1999; and Thom and McDowell, 1999). Third, one of the
main concerns of Irish exporters is that competition from CEECs might reduce
their profits on EU markets — a classical trade-creation scenario, but with
negative welfare effects from an Irish perspective. However, the gravity approach
used in this paper does not allow an analysis of competition effects in third-
country markets, and it thus cannot elucidate one of the key issues of concern to
Irish exporters. Finally, our study is restricted to trade effects, and thereby
does not cover some central items on the agenda of enlargement negotiations,
such as the consequences for Ireland of induced reforms of the EU’s agricultural
and regional policies, or the impact on Ireland’s relative attractiveness as a
destination for foreign investment.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ANDERSON, JAMES E., 1979. “A Theoretical Foundation for the Gravity Equation”,
The American Economic Review, Vol. 69, pp. 106-116.
BALDWIN, RICHARD, 1994. Towards an Integrated Europe, London: Centre for Economic
Policy Research.
BERGSTRAND, JEFFREY H., 1985. “The Gravity Equation in International Trade”,
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 67, pp. 474-481.
BRÜLHART, MARIUS, and ROBERT C. HINE, 1999. Intra-Industry Trade and
Adjustment: The European Experience, London: Macmillan.
COLLINS, SUSAN, and DANI RODRIK, 1991. Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in
the World Economy, Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
DEARDORFF, ALAN V., 1998. “Determinants of Bilateral Trade: Does Gravity Work in
a Neoclassical World?”, in Jeffrey A. Frankel (ed.), The Regionalization of the World
Economy, University of Chicago Press and NBER.
DIMELIS, SOFIA, and KONSTANINE GATSIOS, 1994. “Trade with Central and Eastern
Europe: The Case of Greece”, CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 1005.
EATON, JONATHAN, and SAMUEL KORTUM, 1997. “Technology and Bilateral Trade”,
NBER Working Papers, No. 6253, Cambridge, M.A.: National Bureau of Economic
Research.
EKHOLM, KAROLINA, JOHAN TORSTENSSON, and RASHA TORSTENSSON, 1996.
“The Economics of the Middle East Process: Are There Prospects for Trade and
Growth?” World Economy, Vol. 19, pp. 555-574.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1997. Effects on the Union’s Policies of Enlargement to the
Applicant Countries of Central and Eastern Europe: Agenda 2000 Impact Study,
Brussels: EU Commission DG IA.
EUROSTAT, 1997. Foreign Trade Statistics, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications
of the European Community.
FAINI, RICCARDO, and RICHARD PORTES, 1995. European Union Trade with Eastern
Europe: Adjustment and Opportunities, London: CEPR.
FEENSTRA, ROBERT C., JAMES A. MARKUSEN, and ANDREW K. ROSE, 1998.174 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
“Understanding the Home Market Effect and the Gravity Equation: The Role of
Differentiated Goods”, NBER Working Papers, No. 6804, Cambridge M.A.: National
Bureau of Economic Research.
FITZPATRICK, JIM, 1984. “The Geographical Pattern of Irish Foreign Trade: Test of a
Gravity Model”, The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 19-30.
GALLAGHER, MICHAEL, and DERMOT McALEESE, 1994. “Ireland’s Trade
Dependence on the UK”, Irish Banking Review, pp. 16-28.
GREENAWAY, DAVID, and C.H. NAM, 1988. “Industrialisation and Macroeconomic
Performance in Developing Countries under Alternative Trade Strategies”, Kyklos,
Vol. 41, pp. 419-435.
HAMILTON, CARL B., and L. ALAN WINTERS, 1992. “Opening up Trade with Eastern
Europe”, Economic Policy, Vol. 14, pp. 77-116.
HAVEMAN, JON D., and DAVID HUMMELS, 1996. “Gravity, What is it good for? Theory
and Evidence on Bilateral Trade”, Mimeo, W. Lafayette (IN): Purdue University.
HELPMAN, ELHANAN, and PAUL KRUGMAN, 1985. Market Structure and Foreign
Trade, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.
IBEC, 1996. Enlargement to the East: The Impact on Ireland from a Business Perspective,
Report by the EU Policy Committee, Dublin: Irish Business and Employers’ Con-
federation.
IMF, 1996. Direction of Trade Statistics 1995, Washington DC: International Monetary
Fund.
MARTIN, CARMELA, and JORDI GUAL, 1994. “Trade and Foreign Direct Investment
with Central and Eastern Europe: Its Impact on Spain”, CEPR Discussion Paper,
No. 1006.
NESC, 1997. European Union: Integration and Enlargement, Report No. 101, Dublin:
National Economic and Social Council.
NILSSON, LARS, 1997. “Effects of EU Trade Preferences on Exports from Developing
Countries”, Mimeo, Lund University.
POLAK, JACQUES, 1996. “Is APEC a Natural Regional Trading Bloc?” World Economy,
Vol. 19, pp. 533-543.
SCHUMACHER, DIETER, 1997. “Impact on German Trade of Increased Division of
Labour with Eastern Europe”, in Stanley W. Black, Europe’s Economy Looks East,
Cambridge University Press.
THOM, RODNEY, and MOORE McDOWELL, 1998. “EU-CEE Trade Liberalisation: How
Important is Intra-Industry Trade?” mimeo, Dublin: University College.
TINBERGEN, JAN, 1962. Shaping the World Economy — Suggestions for an International
Economic Policy, New York: Twentieth Century Fund.
VITTAS, HARI, and PAOLO MAURO, 1997. “Potential Trade with Core and Periphery:
Industry Differences in Trade Patterns”, in Stanley W. Black, Europe’s Economy Looks
East, Cambridge University Press.
WINTERS, L. ALAN, and Z.K. WANG, 1994. Eastern Europe’s International Trade,
Manchester University Press.
WORLD BANK, 1997. World Development Indicators, Washington DC.